AI Cyber Defense / Identity, phishing and deepfake resistance
AI Cyber Defense: Verify sender authentication without promising phishing prevention
Use SPF, DKIM and DMARC as domain controls while requiring independent authorization for sensitive actions. Handle failures with the mail team's documented delivery policy.
Environment and inputs: Enterprise identity providers, privileged access, service desks and business approval workflows; controls depend on application support.
Scenario and goal
A message can pass domain authentication and still contain a fraudulent request from a compromised account.
Why it matters
For this scenario, assume the request can use correct names, fluent language and convincing media. The durable boundary is the verified identity and transaction authorization, including enrollment, recovery and exceptions. Distinguish proof of the person from permission for the requested action. A strong authentication method does not by itself authorize a payment, application grant or administrator role change.
Evidence to collect
Preserve authentication results, visible sender, return path, domain alignment and the account activity surrounding the message.
Validate with an authorized exercise
Test approved sender fixtures and a spoofed test domain; confirm alignment evaluation, then show that an authenticated fictional payment request still requires business approval.
Rollout and checks
Before enforcement, inventory application support, fallback methods and the emergency-access path. Roll out to a test group and inspect the evaluated policy at the resource as well as the identity provider. Record session lifetime and revocation behavior separately for each application; do not assume existing access ends immediately when a password or policy changes.
Scope and limits
This guide proposes a defensive test; it is not a tested production design. Check platform support and local requirements. References explain the mechanisms but do not certify the design. Behavior alone does not prove AI involvement.