AI Cyber Defense / Identity, phishing and deepfake resistance
AI Cyber Defense: Treat deepfake executive calls as payment requests
Require a second authorized approver and a callback through an existing trusted directory for beneficiary changes. Keep payment approval outside the meeting tool.
Environment and inputs: Enterprise identity providers, privileged access, service desks and business approval workflows; controls depend on application support.
Scenario and goal
Synthetic audio or video can make an exceptional transfer request sound familiar and urgent.
Why it matters
For this scenario, assume the request can use correct names, fluent language and convincing media. The durable boundary is the verified identity and transaction authorization, including enrollment, recovery and exceptions. Distinguish proof of the person from permission for the requested action. A strong authentication method does not by itself authorize a payment, application grant or administrator role change.
Evidence to collect
Capture the requested beneficiary change, approval record, callback destination source and payment-system audit trail rather than relying on the media itself.
Validate with an authorized exercise
Run a tabletop with a fictional urgent executive request; the payment must remain pending until both independent checks are recorded, even when the media looks credible.
Rollout and checks
Before enforcement, inventory application support, fallback methods and the emergency-access path. Roll out to a test group and inspect the evaluated policy at the resource as well as the identity provider. Record session lifetime and revocation behavior separately for each application; do not assume existing access ends immediately when a password or policy changes.
Scope and limits
This guide proposes a defensive test; it is not a tested production design. Check platform support and local requirements. References explain the mechanisms but do not certify the design. Behavior alone does not prove AI involvement.