AI Cyber Defense / Identity, phishing and deepfake resistance
AI Cyber Defense: Separate vendor identity from payment instructions
Require vendor-bank changes through a controlled workflow with two-person approval and independent verification. Email thread continuity is supporting context rather than authorization.
Environment and inputs: Enterprise identity providers, privileged access, service desks and business approval workflows; controls depend on application support.
Scenario and goal
A fabricated supplier conversation can exploit a real account compromise or imitate an existing thread.
Why it matters
For this scenario, assume the request can use correct names, fluent language and convincing media. The durable boundary is the verified identity and transaction authorization, including enrollment, recovery and exceptions. Distinguish proof of the person from permission for the requested action. A strong authentication method does not by itself authorize a payment, application grant or administrator role change.
Evidence to collect
Compare beneficiary changes with the approved vendor master, independent contact records and original message authentication results.
Validate with an authorized exercise
Submit a fictional supplier bank change through email only; verify the vendor record stays unchanged until the separate workflow and existing-contact callback are complete.
Rollout and checks
Before enforcement, inventory application support, fallback methods and the emergency-access path. Roll out to a test group and inspect the evaluated policy at the resource as well as the identity provider. Record session lifetime and revocation behavior separately for each application; do not assume existing access ends immediately when a password or policy changes.
Scope and limits
This guide proposes a defensive test; it is not a tested production design. Check platform support and local requirements. References explain the mechanisms but do not certify the design. Behavior alone does not prove AI involvement.