AI Cyber Defense / Network edge and segmentation
AI Cyber Defense: Protect DNS resolver access across network zones
Define supported resolver paths by device class and restrict unauthorized direct DNS egress. Provide resilient approved resolvers before enforcing the restriction.
Environment and inputs: Enterprise routers, switches, firewalls, VPNs and workload segmentation; use syntax and features supported by the deployed platform.
Scenario and goal
A host may bypass organizational DNS controls by using alternate resolvers or protocols.
Why it matters
For this scenario, assume discovery can enumerate alternate listeners, address families and routes repeatedly. Define the boundary as permitted communication between named roles, rather than physical network location alone. Separate management, control and application traffic when reviewing the effect of a change. Encryption protects a transport relationship but does not establish that its peer should reach every destination behind it.
Evidence to collect
Collect resolver logs, outbound DNS flow records and managed browser or endpoint resolver settings. Account for approved encrypted DNS services.
Validate with an authorized exercise
From a lab host, resolve an approved test domain through the designated service and verify an unauthorized resolver path is denied without breaking internal name resolution.
Rollout and checks
Export the effective policy and routes before a change and confirm a tested recovery channel. Apply the narrowest change to a representative test segment first. Measure permitted application transactions and forbidden reachability after deployment, including alternate paths. Review deny counters with source and destination context before concluding that a policy is correct or safe to broaden.
Scope and limits
This guide proposes a defensive test; it is not a tested production design. Check platform support and local requirements. References explain the mechanisms but do not certify the design. Behavior alone does not prove AI involvement.