AI Cyber Defense / Identity, phishing and deepfake resistance
AI Cyber Defense: Prevent recovery workflows from bypassing strong MFA
Require a separately verified recovery request and independent approval for privileged accounts. Do not use knowledge of public employee facts as proof of identity.
Environment and inputs: Enterprise identity providers, privileged access, service desks and business approval workflows; controls depend on application support.
Scenario and goal
A help desk may reset a well-protected account after a convincing voice impersonation.
Why it matters
For this scenario, assume the request can use correct names, fluent language and convincing media. The durable boundary is the verified identity and transaction authorization, including enrollment, recovery and exceptions. Distinguish proof of the person from permission for the requested action. A strong authentication method does not by itself authorize a payment, application grant or administrator role change.
Evidence to collect
Inspect recovery tickets, authenticator enrollment changes, operator identity and the interval between reset and privileged activity.
Validate with an authorized exercise
Exercise a fictional caller with accurate public details; verify that reset is refused until the approved independent verification and escalation steps complete.
Rollout and checks
Before enforcement, inventory application support, fallback methods and the emergency-access path. Roll out to a test group and inspect the evaluated policy at the resource as well as the identity provider. Record session lifetime and revocation behavior separately for each application; do not assume existing access ends immediately when a password or policy changes.
Scope and limits
This guide proposes a defensive test; it is not a tested production design. Check platform support and local requirements. References explain the mechanisms but do not certify the design. Behavior alone does not prove AI involvement.