AI Cyber Defense / Identity, phishing and deepfake resistance
AI Cyber Defense: Link mailbox rule creation to account compromise triage
Restrict external forwarding and flag newly created concealment or redirection rules. Review related sessions before treating the rule as an isolated configuration issue.
Environment and inputs: Enterprise identity providers, privileged access, service desks and business approval workflows; controls depend on application support.
Scenario and goal
An attacker may quietly redirect messages after a credible phishing exchange succeeds.
Why it matters
For this scenario, assume the request can use correct names, fluent language and convincing media. The durable boundary is the verified identity and transaction authorization, including enrollment, recovery and exceptions. Distinguish proof of the person from permission for the requested action. A strong authentication method does not by itself authorize a payment, application grant or administrator role change.
Evidence to collect
Collect inbox-rule changes, forwarding configuration, application grants and message access with stable mailbox and actor identifiers.
Validate with an authorized exercise
Create a harmless rule in a test mailbox; verify the audit event reaches the case and that a policy-prohibited external forwarding attempt is blocked.
Rollout and checks
Before enforcement, inventory application support, fallback methods and the emergency-access path. Roll out to a test group and inspect the evaluated policy at the resource as well as the identity provider. Record session lifetime and revocation behavior separately for each application; do not assume existing access ends immediately when a password or policy changes.
Scope and limits
This guide proposes a defensive test; it is not a tested production design. Check platform support and local requirements. References explain the mechanisms but do not certify the design. Behavior alone does not prove AI involvement.