AI Cyber Defense / Identity, phishing and deepfake resistance
AI Cyber Defense: Control delegated application identities after staff departures
Transfer legitimate ownership through a documented process and revoke obsolete user-bound access. Verify each application's actual token revocation and retention behavior.
Environment and inputs: Enterprise identity providers, privileged access, service desks and business approval workflows; controls depend on application support.
Scenario and goal
Removing a user may leave application permissions or shared integration ownership active.
Why it matters
For this scenario, assume the request can use correct names, fluent language and convincing media. The durable boundary is the verified identity and transaction authorization, including enrollment, recovery and exceptions. Distinguish proof of the person from permission for the requested action. A strong authentication method does not by itself authorize a payment, application grant or administrator role change.
Evidence to collect
Reconcile offboarding records with application owners, delegated consent, refresh-token handling and service-account custody.
Validate with an authorized exercise
Offboard a test user that owns a harmless integration; confirm ownership is reassigned or the integration is disabled, and access checks match the recorded decision.
Rollout and checks
Before enforcement, inventory application support, fallback methods and the emergency-access path. Roll out to a test group and inspect the evaluated policy at the resource as well as the identity provider. Record session lifetime and revocation behavior separately for each application; do not assume existing access ends immediately when a password or policy changes.
Scope and limits
This guide proposes a defensive test; it is not a tested production design. Check platform support and local requirements. References explain the mechanisms but do not certify the design. Behavior alone does not prove AI involvement.